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Abstract
This paper analyzes the equilibrium play in a random matching model with a
changing environment. Under myopic decision making, players adopt imitation strate-
gies similar to those observed in evolutionary models with sampling from past play
in the population. If the players are patient, equilibrium strategies display elements
of experimentation in addition to imitation. If the changes in the environment are
infrequent enough, these strategies succeed in coordinating almost all of the players
on the dominant action almost all of the time. The myopic rules, on the other hand,
result in mis-coordination for a positive fraction of time.
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11 Introduction
When economic agents can observe sample outcomes from the past play in the population,
they can react to the observations in two possible ways. They may decide to imitate the
players who are using the most e®ective actions, or to experiment with an alternative
strategy that they did not observe in the population sample. When the environment is
stable, models in evolutionary game theory predict that under mild regularity conditions,
myopic players adopt imitative behavior and select the dominant action whenever it exists.
This paper considers an equilibrium model where the environment changes from period to
period and dominant actions become dominated at random times. With myopic players,
imitation strategies are still selected in equilibrium, but the players are not coordinated on
the dominant action all the time. However, in a model with forward-looking players, we
show that sampling from population play yields an equilibrium where both imitation and
experimentation are present. Even though experimentation provides a public good in the
model, the equilibrium experimentation is su±cient to coordinate almost all the agents on
the dominant action almost all the time if the changes in the environment are infrequent
enough.
The model we analyze has two states of nature and two actions. In the ¯rst state, the
¯rst action is dominant, in the second, it is dominated. In order to represent informa-
tion transmission through sampling from the population play, we imagine a continuum of
identical players matched according to a Poisson arrival process. As is customary in the
evolutionary game theory literature, we are interested in the relative payo® comparison
between individuals, rather than the absolute payo®s received by a single player. In line
with that purpose, we assume that the players are matched to play a zero sum game with
the following property. Whenever the players choose the same action, the game ends in
a draw regardless of the true state, so that the match is not informative on the state of
nature. If, on the other hand, a player wins by playing the ¯rst action, then she (and her
opponent) can deduce the true state of the world at the moment of the match. The state
2changes according to a stationary Markov transition process, independently of any actions
taken in the game.
We consider ¯rst the case in which players observe the entire history of play and maxi-
mize their myopic utility. The equilibrium in this game takes a form familiar in evolutionary
game theory: players adopt purely imitative strategies where all players choose the same
action as in the previous period until a loss is observed. Our main result in this context is
that under these imitation dynamics, the population play is not responsive to state changes.
In fact, while the population shares of players choosing either strategy take all the values
in the open unit interval in¯nitely often, the population fraction of players choosing, say,
the ¯rst action crosses any ¯xed value in the unit interval very infrequently in comparison
to the frequency of state changes. In other words, most of the state changes do not a®ect
the play of most of the players.
In the second model, we introduce forward-looking behavior, and assume that all players
maximize their expected future stream of utilities. For simplicity we assume that players
retain only single period histories and hence they condition only on the outcome in the
previous match.1 It is not hard to see that a symmetric adoption of the purely imitative
strategies cannot constitute an equilibrium for this game. If almost all players in the
population are playing a ¯xed action regardless of the true state of nature, then it is
optimal for an individual player to experiment, i.e. choose an action di®erent from the
previous action following a draw. To see this, notice that the losses from an experiment
last for a single period since the choice of a dominated action results almost certainly in the
detection of the true state in the next period, and hence the play will revert to original play.
A successful experiment, however, has payo® implication beyond the single period. The
bene¯ts from an experiment accumulate until the next state change. If the state changes
are infrequent enough, then the bene¯ts outweigh the losses, and the symmetric adoption
of imitating strategies cannot be an equilibrium.
1We will show that this bounded-rational strategy yields almost the same payoﬁ of fully-rational strate-
gies for our case of interest.
3We show that the model with forward-looking players has a symmetric (and stationary)
mixed strategy equilibrium where all the players randomize with the same probability
following the observation of a draw in the previous match. The main result of the paper
is the characterization of these equilibria for infrequent state changes. In particular, it is
shown that the fraction of time that any ¯xed population share spends on the dominated
action converges to zero as state changes become infrequent. In other words, almost all of
the players choose the dominated action almost all of the time as the state changes become
rare. A consequence of this result is that with infrequent state changes, it would not be in
any given player's self interest to sample additional past observation at a positive cost.
The techniques that we develop for the analysis might be of use in other contexts such as
search models in a changing economic environment. Between the state changes, aggregate
play in this model is deterministic by the law of large numbers. When the state changes,
the law of motion changes for the aggregate population. The resulting compound stochastic
process is an example of a piecewise-deterministic process as described in Davis 1993. The
ergodic theory of these processes is quite simple, and we can make repeated use of renewal
theory.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the literature review. Section 3
introduces the model. Section 4 analyzes myopic players. Section 5 contains the equilibrium
analysis for the case of forward-looking players. Section 6 analyzes the adoption of new
technologies. Section 7 concludes, and the proofs are in Appendix.
2 Related Literature
This paper is connected to three strands of literature. In the herding literature, Ellison and
Fudenberg (1995) identify conditions under which players will select the \correct" action
given the state of the world, when sampling from population play and adopting a \must-
see-to-adopt" rule (i.e. players may change their action only if they sample some players
taking a better alternative). Banerjee and Fudenberg (1996) allow players to adopt fully-
4rational decision rules and show that if players sample from the population in a proportional
fashion, and signals are informative enough to outweight the prior, at the only stationary
outcome all agents make the correct choice. To our knowledge, this paper is the ¯rst to
study experimentation and social learning in a changing environment with forward looking
agents. Smith and Sorensen (1999) explicitly introduce forward-looking behavior in a ¯xed
environment and show that the set of stationary cascades shrinks as individuals become
more patient. Moscarini, Ottaviani and Smith (1998) analyze a social learning model in
a changing world with myopic players, their result on the fragility of cascades depends on
exogenous private signals relative to the state of the world.
The implications of sampling from population play have been studied extensively in
the evolutionary games literature. A preliminary contribution is the work of Boylan (1992)
that identi¯ed matching schemes that allow the approximation of the stochastic population
evolution by means of a dynamic system. Nachbar (1990), Friedman (1991) and Samuel-
son and Zhang (1992) independently introduce payo®-monotonic dynamics and show that
in continuous time, iterated strictly dominated strategies will be extinct in the long-run
population if the initial population play is full support (see also Dekel and Scotchmer 1992,
Cabrales and Sobel 1992, Bjornestedt 1993, and Hofbauer and Weibull 1996). Speci¯c char-
acterizations of payo®-monotonic dynamics have then been derived in models of `learning
by sampling the population play' by Bjornestedt (1993), Bjornestedt and Weibull (1993),
Schlag (1998), and Borgers and Sarin (1999).
Models of experimentation in a changing world were treated in the single agent case
by Rustichini and Wolinsky (1995) and by Keller and Rady (1999), in a setting where
a monopolist needs to choose between a sure action and an uncertain alternative whose
value changes randomly over time. They show that patient players will converge on the
optimal action almost all the times if the state changes are infrequent enough. In our
model, the forward looking optimal experimentation aspect of these models is combined
with the e®ects of social learning and imitation.
53T h e M o d e l
A continuum population of players indexed by the points in the unit interval are matched
according to a Poisson process with parameter ¹ to play one of two symmetric 2£2c o n t e s t s ,
G1 or G2: In other words, the probability that player j 2 [0;1] is matched to play within
t h et i m ei n t e r v a l( t;t +¢ t)i s¹¢t for ¢t small. The two possible payo® matrices G1 and










Note that action ai is strictly dominant in game Gi for i =1 ;2:2 If the players are not sure
which Gi they are playing, they can tell the two games apart conditional on observing an
outcome o® the main diagonal. A diagonal outcome does not help the players in distin-
guishing between the two games. This simple speci¯cation allows us to focus our attention
on the informational content on relative payo® comparison among individuals, and to rule
any informational content of the absolute value of a player's payo®. Denote the set of player
i0s opponents in period t by j (t) 2 [0;1] [; ; where j (t)=; if j is not matched in period
t: De¯ne the function mj (t) ´ supfm<tj j (m) 6= ;g . Notice that because of Poisson
matching, Prfmj (t) <t g =1 ; and mj (t) has an interpretation as the last time before t
in which j was matched. Since the payo®s are de¯ned as expectations over the matching
probabilities and other variables, we can assign any behavior to the zero probability events
where mj (t)=t without changing payo®s.
Denote the event that game Gi is played in period t by f!(t)=!ig: The state space
describing uncertainty about the game in period t is then given by ­ = f!1;!2g: The key
ingredient in this paper is that the state changes exogenously over time. For concreteness,
we assume that the state change process is another Poisson process with parameter ¸:3 Let
2The normalization to unit gains and losses oﬁ the diagonal is made for convenience. The main results
of the paper would go through in the more general case as well.
3Alternatively, we could suppose that the state durations are drawn independently from a known dis-
tribution, Fi (T); for state !i: In other words, if there is a state change at instant t to state !i; then
Pr(! (s)=!i for t<s<u )=Fi (u ¡ t):
6aj (t) denote the action that player j would choose if matched at instant t: The evolution
of play in the population is governed by the strategies of the players and the random state
changes.
4 Myopic Optimization
Consistently with previous contributions in evolutionary games literature, we assume in
this section that each player maximizes her payo® in a myopic fashion.
We ¯rst de¯ne the history observed by player j: Let t be the vector of previous match-
ing times of j. The vector of actions chosen by j in the previous matches is then denoted











; where the last component underlines that strategies may de-
pend on calendar time.
A pure strategy of an arbitrary player j at instant t is then
s
j : h
j (t) !f a1;a 2g:
Denoting by a(t) the random action of a player from the population at time t; we will












The ¯rst Proposition shows that the unique equilibrium is such that players will always
adopt the imitation rule.
Proposition 1 If players are myopic optimizers, for any ¸, and ¹; the equilibrium strategy:
s(a1;1) = s(a1;0) = s(a2;¡1) = a1 (1)
s(a2;1) = s(a2;0) = s(a1;¡1) = a2:
7The intuition is simple. Since the gain for successful experimentation coincides with
the loss for unsuccessful experimentation, players will deviate from experimentation only
when assessing the state changed has occurred with probability at least a half. This is
never the case under Poisson arrivals, because the probability that no state change has
occurred dominates the probability that one and only one state change has occurred, and
the probability that exactly 2k state changes has occurred dominates the probability that
2k + 1 state changes have occurred, for any k>0:
We denote the strategies derived in Proposition 1 as imitation strategies. It is important
to notice that if Gi is the game played in all t, this dynamics leads to an asymptotic steady
state where all players correctly assess the state of the world !i and play action ai: The
following analysis shows that in changing environments, imitation strategies do not allow
players to correctly assess the state of the world over time.
Denote the population fraction of players using a1 in period t by x(t), i.e. using the
l a wo fl a r g en u m b e r s ,w eh a v e
x(t)=P rfa(t)=a1g
for a randomly picked player in t: To obtain a characterization of the rates of change of
the actions in the population, we need to make a distinction according to the state of
nature that prevails at t. Since the state changes according to a Poisson process, the time
derivatives of the population fractions exist almost everywhere. In !1; the law of motion
for x(t) is given (almost everywhere) by:
¢
x(t)=¹(1 ¡ x(t))x(t):
Of all the matched players (that have instantaneous °ow rate of ¹), only those playing a2
(fraction (1 ¡ xt)) that are matched with players playing a1 (fraction x(t)) adjust their
behavior with positive probability. The solution to this di®erential equation yields the
















The dynamics for the population fraction playing a2 follows immediately from the constant






The main task in this section is to patch these two dynamics together to yield an overall
population dynamics in the changing environment. Start the system without loss of gener-
ality at x(0) = 1
2;!(0) = !1: Denote the random times of state changes by f¿ig
1
i=1 ; where
¿i is the physical instant of ith state switch. Notice that for i odd, the switches are from
!1 to !2 and for i even, they are from !2 to !1. As the state changes are characterized by
a Poisson arrival process, the expected waiting time between ¿i and ¿i+1 is 1
‚. To derive
the asymptotic properties of this process, consider the population shares at the switching
times, x(¿i): We know that x(¿i) <x (¿j+1)f o ri even and the reverse inequality holds
for i odd. Consider ¯rst the following limit:





; for A ½ (0;1);
where IA(x(t)) = 1 if x(t) 2 A and IA (x(t)) = 0 if x(t) = 2 A: This limit measures
asymptotically the fraction of time that x(t) spends in an arbitrary set A.T h e n e x t
lemma shows that this limit is 0 for all closed A.
Lemma 1 If players are myopic optimizers, for any ¸, and ¹; then xA =0for all closed
A ½ (0;1):
We need the following de¯nition to make precise the notion that the play in the popu-
lation as described by x(t) is not very sensitive to state changes.
De¯nition 1 State !i is ²-undetected for duration i if x(t) ¸ 1 ¡ ² for ¿i  t  ¿i+1, i
odd and !1 is ²-undetected for duration i if x(t)  ² for ¿i  t  ¿i+1, i even.
9In words, all but at most ² fraction of players in the population play the dominated
action for the time interval in question. The previous lemma can be used to prove the
following proposition.
Proposition 2 If players are myopic optimizers, for any ¸, and ¹; i nt h el o n gr u n ,ah a l f
of the state durations is ²-undetected for all ²>0.
In words, the proposition above characterizes the frequency of large shifts in the pop-
ulation play in relation to the frequency of the state changes. An alternative statement
would be that in the long run, the population play reacts to only a negligible subset of
actual state changes, and as a result, the majority of the population play a constant action
for a time interval that is by far longer than a single state duration.
Therefore even if the prior is correctly assigned and payo® comparisons are perfectly
informative about the state of the world, sampling from population play fails to keep track of
state changes with myopic agents. In evolutionary game theory terms, strictly dominated
strategies do not vanish in the stationary distribution implied by any payo®-monotonic
regular dynamics.
Remark 1 In case the state changes occur with di®erent probability, or gains for taking
the dominant action do not coincide, the players will not always adopt imitative strategies.
Suppose in fact that the state changes from !j to !i with rate ¸i; and without loss of
generality, that ¸2 >¸ 1: Then the optimal decision rule includes histories after which a
player adopts action a2 even though at the previous match she played a1 and tied with the
opponent. The main result of the section, Proposition 2, however continues to hold in the
sense that the population play concentrates on the action a2 in the long run: Therefore the
!1-state durations will be ²-undetected for all ²>0. The same result holds in the case
that u(a2;a 1;! 2) >u(a1;a 2;!1): In sum, dominated actions are adopted in the long run







of the total time. More details are in the Appendix.
105 Forward-Looking Optimization
In this section, we assume that each player cares about her own payo® as well as about the
her current payo® as well as the future payo®s. At the same time, for analytical tractability,
we assume use stationary strategies with a single period memory. We will see at the end
of the section that such an assumption does not entail signi¯cant predictive loss. As in the
previous section, we present only the case for ¸1 = ¸2:4




















In fact, some of the information is super°uous since the action of the opponent can be
deduced from the payo® realization. Therefore it is more convenient to de¯ne the history
as hj (t)=( aj (mj (t));u j (mj (t))). Notice that we are implicitly assuming here that players
do not know mj (t), i.e. the strategies do not depend on calendar time. A pure strategy of
an arbitrary player j at instant t is then
s
j : h
j (t) !f a1;a 2g:
In order to simplify the calculations, we use the overtaking criterion rather than the dis-
counted sum of payo®s for evaluating sequences of outcomes.5 Formally, let fmkg
1
k=0 ´ m
be the random sequence of future matching times for j. The sequence of future actions cho-
sen by j is then denoted by faj (mk)g
1





k=0 ´ aj(m): To evaluate the utilities from various action pro¯les,
















4The case for ‚1 6= ‚2 yields indistinguishable results. The Appendix, when presenting the proofs of
the statements presented in this section, also points out the diﬁerences for the case when ‚1 6= ‚2.
5The limit of means criterion is does not discriminate enough bewteen sequences of outcomes for our
purposes since the eﬁect of any individual decisions is vanishing in the limit (the processes that result from
the analysis are strongly mixing).
11If the summation above does not converge, assign the value ¡1 to ¼: Since the players
are randomly matched, an expectation must be taken over the future opponents when
evaluating the payo®s.
Consider player j at the moment of her decision between a1 and a2; let her choice be
called ai, and notice that a1 and a2 induce di®erent distribution of continuation plays. Let
the future actions conditional on an initial choice ai by a
j
i so that a choice at matching
instant mk following initial choice ai is given by a
j
i (mk): Let m; a
j
i and the actions of future
opponents, aj(m), be drawn from their respective distributions.
According to the overtaking criterion, player j prefers action a1 to action a2 if there is






















where the expectations are taken with respect to the random matching probabilities. In the
last part of the section, the impact of the current choice on the future choices and payo®s
is made explicit.
We solve for the symmetric stationary equilibrium strategies of the game. Formally, we
are looking for a strategy s 2 S such that it is optimal for each player to use s if all the
other players use s: Notice that here we are assuming that a player's own future choices
comply with s:
The ¯rst two results of this section make the case for imitation and experimentation.
The following Lemma, in particular, shows that the optimal strategy must yield imitation
after a history that reveals the state of the world.
Proposition 3 For any ¹ and ¸; at equilibrium, s(a1;1) = s(a2;¡1) = a1; and s(a2;1) =
s(a1;¡1) = a2:
While imitation is settled as the optimal strategy when the history reveals the true
state of the world, the next result establishes the value of experimentation after histories
that do not reveal the state of the world. As long as the states do not change too often,
12there does not exist an equilibrium where players play imitation after any such histories.
In what follows, we use ¾ to indicate the mixed strategy of any given player.
Proposition 4 For all ¸; there is a ¹(¸) such that, at the stationary, symmetric equilib-
rium,
Prfs(a1;0) = a1g < 1, Prfs(a2;0) = a2g < 1
whenever ¹ ¸ ¹(¸):
The intuition behind this result is quite simple. If all the other players are using the
imitation strategies from the previous section, then it is optimal for a given individual
to change her action conditional on observing a tie in her previous match. The reason
for this is that the play within the population does not react to most state changes in
the long run, and therefore a single trial leads to a large expected number of wins in the
future if the population is currently concentrated on the inferior action. If the population
is concentrated on the dominant action, a change of actions leads to a single period loss.
Therefore the gains are obtained over many periods if the meeting rate is high, and losses
take place in a single period, and it is optimal to change actions if ¹ is high enough.
Given that the state changes with the same rate from !1 to !2 and from !2 to !1; it is
meaningful to restrict attention to equilibria where Prfs(a1;0) = a1g = fs(a2;0) = a2g;
and we introduce " =1¡Prfs(ai;0) = aig: In words, the relevant strategies always choose
the dominant action in the previous match if it is identi¯ed by the outcome. If the state
is not revealed in the previous match, then the same action, ai; as before is chosen with
probability 1 ¡ ":
For each ¯xed ¹; and for any choice of the experimentation parameter "; we can derive
the law of motion for the population choices of actions. As before, let x" (t) denote the
fraction of players choosing action a1 in period t: Note that we are parametrizing the process
13of population play by the relevant experimentation probabilities. In state !1; we have:
¢
x" (t)=¹x" (t)(1¡ x" (t)) + ¹"(1 ¡ x" (t))




" + x" (t)(1¡ 2") ¡ x" (t)
2¤
:
It is easy to calculate the long run level of x" (t) in the case where the state does not change.
For this, we simply set the rate of change in the above equation equal to zero and solve for
the stationary x": The relevant root of the quadratic equation is:
¹ x"1;"2 =





The same reasoning leads to the following law of motion and the corresponding long













Notice that for ">0; ¹ x" < 1; and x" > 0: In other words, the process of population play is
bounded away from the boundary of the unit interval. This induces a qualitative change in
the behavior of the system as compared to the case with pure strategies. For example, it is
easy to see that x(t) has a unique invariant distribution on the open interval (x"; ¹ x"):6 This
is in sharp contrast with the pure strategy case where the process spends asymptotically
all of its time arbitrarily close to the boundary of [0;1]:
An easy intuition for the di®erence in the results is the following. By introducing the
randomization, the time symmetry in the process is broken. In particular, in state !1,t h e
rate of increase of x(t) approaches 0 as x(t) converges to ¹ x": On the other hand, the rate
of decrease (i.e. also the rate of increase of action a2)a t¹ x" is bounded away from zero for
all ">0:7
6Unfortunately the calculation of the invariant distribution is not an easy matter. For general results
on stochastic processes of the type described above, see e.g. Davis (1996).
7The exact laws of motion in the two states can be solved by performing a simple change of variables.
Since the formulas are not used later, they are omitted here.
14In order to start the analysis of the individual decision problem, we need to make an
assumption about the initial distribution of the action pro¯le in the population as well as
the initial state !0: Since we do not want to give any particular signi¯cance to the initial
period and since the joint process (x(t);!(t)) is ergodic on (x"; ¹ x") £ ­; a natural initial
condition seems to be that all variables are drawn from the relevant invariant distribution.
The implicit assumption then is that this game has been played during an arbitrarily long
history prior to the start of the analysis. A consequence of this modeling choice is that the
decision problem of all the individuals is the same prior to observing the outcome in the
previous match
To address the optimal choice of an action by any given player, we use a statistical
technique called coupling. The idea is to generate two independent copies of a random
process on the same probability space and deduce payo® consequences from the joint evo-
lution. The key observation for this analysis is that the process determining the future
opponents of a player and the population shares of the actions in the population at the
matching times are independent of the past actions of the player. As in all equilibrium
analysis, each player takes the actions of all other players (including her own future ac-
tions) as given and chooses a best response. The current choice of a player has implications
for her future payo®s only through the observations that are generated by that choice. The
following proposition however states formally that the di®erence in the distribution of the
continuation play induced by a di®erent initial action choice vanishes in ¯nite time.
Lemma 2 For almost all m; a
j





2 (mk); for all k>K :Furthermore, EK < 1; where the expectation is taken with respect
to the distribution of m;a
j
i and aj(m):
Since the payo®s are evaluated according to the overtaking criterion, we can concentrate
on the di®erences in the payo®s during the ¯rst K periods. We start by showing that
the game has no symmetric pure strategy equilibria. Recall that under the assumption
"1 = "2 = "; any proposed symmetric stationary equilibrium pro¯le is characterized by
15a single parameter, ": The exogenous environment is parametrized by (¸;¹): We hold ¸
¯xed throughout the discussion and let ¹ vary. This is without loss of generality since the
model with parameters (p¸;p¹)i se q u i v a l e n tt o( ¸;¹) apart from a linear scaling in the
units of measurement for time. Fix a particular player,j; and denote her set of optimal
experimentation probabilities when all others experiment at rate "; and the rate of matches
is ¹ by ®„ ("):
Lemma 3 There is a ¹ ¹ such that for all ¹ ¸ ¹ ¹; ®„ (0) = 1:
As a result, we conclude that zero experimentation is not a symmetric equilibrium. The
next Lemma shows that the rate of experimentation in a symmetric equilibrium cannot be
very high if the frequency of matches is high.
Lemma 4 For any ¹ ">0; there is a ¹ ¹(¹ ") such that ®„ (")=0for all " ¸ ¹ " and ¹ ¸ ¹ ¹:
The intuition for this result is also quite straightforward. If there is su±cient hetero-
geneity in the population, it is very unlikely for a player to realize the bene¯ts from an
experiment for a long string of matches. At the same time, the action that resulted in a
draw is more likely to be the dominant action, and since a (relatively) large fraction of the
opponents are experimenting, the myopic gain from not experimenting is quite high.
Since the payo® function of player j is continuous in the population experimentation
rate " since it is a time integral of a payo® that is continuous in " against a Poisson arrival
process, Lemma 3, Lemma 4 and a simple application of the intermediate value theorem
allow us to conclude the main existence result of this section.
Proposition 5 For all ¹; there is an ">0 such that " 2 ®„ ("): Furthermore, lim„!1"(¹)=
0; where "(¹)=s u pf" j " 2 ®„ (")g:
In words, we have demonstrated the existence of symmetric equilibria. Furthermore, we
have shown that for large ¹; the equilibrium experimentation probabilities are small. The
remainder of this section investigates the asymptotic rate at which " converges to zero as ¹
16increases. This is exercise is essential if we want to get a good idea of how well coordinated
the population is on the dominant action in the long run as the state changes become very
rare in comparison to the matches.
In order to obtain estimates on the rate of convergence, it is useful to look at an auxiliary
random process that approximates the population process x(t) for large ¹: The key to the
approximation that we perform is the observation that the real time that it takes for the
frequency of action a1 to grow from an arbitrarily low level ± to 1 ¡ ± is extremely short
for ¹ large. As a result, for ¹ large, x(t) spends most of its time close to 0 or 1. Hence we
approximate the process x(t) by a simpler process that lives on the two asymptotic values
calculated above for the real population process.
Let ^ x„ (t) 2f x"; ¹ x"g be the approximate population process. To make the approxi-
mation valid as ¹ !1 ; we need to describe how much time is spent in each of the two
possible states. Let T (¹;") be the amount of real time that the approximating process
spends in state x": The approximation is valid if we require that T (¹;") equals the amount
of time that it takes for the population to increase from x" to 1
2: A tt h es a m et i m e ,w em u s t
make sure that T (¹;") is such that each player is indi®erent between experimenting and
not experimenting. Combining these two requirements, we obtain a characterization of the
aggregate equilibrium behavior as ¹ !1 :
Proposition 6 For any "(¹) such that "(¹) 2 ®„ ("(¹));
lim
„!1










The validity of the approximation used to get this result is also shown in the appendix.
The message of the theorem is clear. Since the total expected number of matches grows
linearly in ¹; and since the number of matches before the state change is 1
2¡detected in the
terminology of the previous section (and also 1 ¡ ° detected for any °>0) grows linearly
in
p
¹; almost all the players are choosing the dominant action almost all of the time when
17¹ !1 : Thus we are close to full optimality in a qualitative sense even though the public
goods nature of experimentation leads to some suboptimality.
In the remainder of the section, we sketch out an argument to show that it is not in
any player's interest to buy costly information about past matches, and to keep track of
calendar time. With that in mind, we may interpret the model as one of endogenously
imperfect recall.
Fix as a baseline the full information optimal strategy: play a1 if and only if !(t)=1 :
Consider the expected loss of the bounded memory strategy along a renewal cycle (¿k;¿k+1);
where !(t)=1f o rt 2 (¿k;¿k+1): Consider T such that. x(T + ¿k)=1¡ ¹ x" ¡ ±: For each
¯xed ±; we know that T ! 0f o r¹ !1 : Again set ¸ =1 : Against the 1-period-memory
equilibrium population, the optimal strategy average payo® per renewal cycle is bounded
above by [T +(¹ x" + ±)(1 ¡ T)]:
We know that ¹ x" ¼ " ! 0 so the limiting payo® from using the optimal strategy is
bounded from above by ±: If the players were able to purchase full information in each
period at cost C; their optimal average payo® would thus be bounded above by ± ¡ C:
Consider the average payo® per state duration in !1 when using the equilibrium strategy.
By revealed preference we know that such a payo® is not larger than the average payo®
obtained by a player using the pure imitation strategies of the second section. This payo®
is bounded below by ¡1=¹; as with probability close to 1, player j will face an opponent
taking a1; receive a payo® of ¡1a n dp l a ya2 thereafter. For an arbitrary C>0; we can
choose ±>0 small enough and ¹ large enough to have ¡ 1
„ >±¡ C:
If information about past moves and calendar time came for free, the optimal strategy
of player j would be summarized by a sequence of switching times fTkg1
k=1 we call alarm-
clocks. Letting T0 denote the time of the last matching revealing the state of the world,
player j will play the pure-imitation action at times t 2 (Tk;T k+1) k even, and the opposite
action at times t 2 (Tk;T k+1): The optimal sequence fTkg1
k=1 represents the instants in
which the expected di®erential payo® for reverting action crosses a threshold derived from
the indi®erence principle. Since non-revealing matches such as (a1;0) are informative of the
18population play the optimal sequence does not only depend on the time of the last state-
revealing match, but also on the instants of subsequent non-revealing matches. Because of
that, the exact determination of optimal alarm-clocks becomes rather messy.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we considered the evolution of play in a changing environment. The particular
model was chosen to re°ect the idea that players can learn from relative payo® comparisons,
but not from their absolute stage game payo®s. A more realistic assumption would be to
allow for some learning from own past choices regardless of the actions that other agents
chose. The techniques developed here would be useful for those models as well as long as
social learning is not swamped by learning from own past experiences.
Consider, for example, a model where the players choose between a safe action whose
payo® is independent of the state of the world, and an uncertain action that yields a high
payo® in one of the states and a low payo® in the other. Assume also that prior to choosing
their next action, the players observe the action and the payo® of a randomly selected player
in the population. Using the techniques of this model, we could show that equilibria of
that model are approximately e±cient as the state changes become infrequent enough.
7 Appendix
7.1 Proofs Omitted from Section 4
Proof of Proposition 1. Since players are myopic, the bene¯t for successful exper-
imentation is +1; and the loss for unsuccessful experimentation is ¡1: Without loss of
generality, set equal to 0 the time of the last match that revealed the state of the world.
Thus a player's payo® depends only on whether an odd or even number k of renewals has







¡‚s Pr(k ¡ 1;(s;t);2)ds
19iteratively for any k>0: Recursive calculations show that for any t>0; and any l ¸ 0;
Pr(2l;(0;t);1) > Pr(2l +1;(0;t);1): Therefore the optimal strategy is always imitation.
Proof of Lemma 1. Given the monotonicity of xA in the set inclusion, it is su±cient
to check that the claim holds for all closed intervals, A =[ ²;1 ¡ ²]:
De¯ne the sequence of random variables f¾kg, fy1kg; and f¯kg as follows. Let ¢1s






ys =¢ 1s ¡ ¢2s;¾ k =
k X
i=1
yi;¯ k = ¾k + y1k+1
f¾kg is a random walk with a strictly positive, but bounded variance. Then ¯k >¾ k and









x0 e¡„K(") ¸ 1 ¡ ":
whenever ¾k >K(²): Note that this also yields x(¿2k+1) <²whenever ¯k < ¡K (²):
Since both ¾k and ¯k are driftless random walks with strictly positive (and constant)
variance for all k, the expected time to re-entry to [¡1;K(²)] by ¾k is in¯nite (and
similarly for ¯k) by the contrapositive of the Wald equation (see Durrett 1996). Start-
ing inside [¡K (²);K(²)]; the expected hitting time for ¾k (and for ¯k)t o[ K (²);1]
[[¡1;¡K (²)] is bounded above by K (²)
2 =E[y2
1] < 1: In fact ¾2
k ¡ kE[y2
1] is a martin-
gale, and letting T =i n f fk : ¾k = 2 [¡K (²);K(²)]g; and starting with ¾2











=0 a . s .
Proof of Proposition 2. We need to show that for all ²>0;
lim
i!1






By the previous result, choose K (²)t ob es u c ht h a t¯k >K(²) ) x(¯k) > 1¡²: ,w ek n o w
that x(t) spends all of its total time in (0;²) [(1 ¡ ²;1): The claim is then true unless the
process crosses from (0;²)t o( 1¡ ²;1) on a positive fraction of the total state changes. But
this would contradict x[†;1¡†] =0 :
207.2 Myopic Players with ¸1 6= ¸2
In this section we characterize the optimal strategy of myopic players when the state changes
occur with di®erent probabilities, and show that the population will concentrate on the
action correspondent on the state with highest °ow rate, so that all durations in the smallest
°ow state will be undetected.
The determination of the optimal decision of players conditioning their choice on the
complete history of play and on calendar time is rather involved when ¸1 6= ¸2 is rather
involved and it is thus postponed to further research. For our current purposes, it su±ces
to point out that it will not consists of purely imitative strategies.
First note that if ¸1 is very dissimilar to ¸2; the optimal strategy cannot be imitation.
It is in fact straightforward to notice that ¸1=¸2 !1 ; and ¹ is ¯xed, the problem ap-
proximates one where no signi¯cant uncertainty about the environment occurs, and so the
optimal strategy is to play always a2; the dominant strategy when the true state of the
world is !2: Also since strategies depend on calendar time, for any triple (¸1;¸ 2;¹), one can
¯nd histories after which players will not adopt the imitation. Suppose in fact that ¸2 >¸ 1;
pick any player j with history (a1;0); and let ¿ denote the last time j was matched. For
¿ large enough, since the process is strongly mixing, the relative probability of the state
being !1 will approximate ¸1=[¸1 + ¸2]; and thus player j will play action a2:
On the other hand, if ¸2 >¸ 1; a straightforward extension of the proof of Proposition
1 yields that at equilibrium s(a1;¡1) = s(a2;0) = s(a2;1) = a2: players never abandon
action a2 unless it was defeated at the previous match.
In the next Proposition we will show that if ¸2 >¸ 1; the !1-state durations will not be
detected by the population dynamics induced by pure imitation. The result holds a fortiori
for the dynamics induced by equilibrium strategies, because, under the latter, a1 is played
after a non-larger set of histories than implied pure imitation.
Proposition 7 If ¸1 <¸ 2; then x(t) converges to 1 (almost surely) as t goes to in¯nity.
If ¸1 >¸ 2 then xt converges to 0 (almost surely) as t goes to in¯nity.
Proof. The sequence f¾kg is a random walk with a strictly positive, but bounded
variance. The recurrence properties of this walk depend on whether ys has a zero mean.
If the mean is positive, i.e., ¸1 <¸ 2, then by strong law of large numbers, for all K;










x0 e¡„K(") ¸ 1 ¡ ":
Since ¾k >K(") for all but ¯nitely many k; the almost sure convergence of the process to
1 follows. A similar construction applies to the case where ¸1 >¸ 2:
An easy way of understanding the intuition behind this result is to notice the symmetry
of equations 2 and 3. Hence we could interpret the two imitation processes as motions
along the same curve in di®erent directions. To ¯nd out what happens to the position
of a particle, we need to look at the combined impact of the two processes on the total
displacement. But this is obtained simply by multiplying the speed by expected time to
next state change, and the result follows.
7.3 Proof Omitted from Section 5
Proof of Proposition 3. Since the player knows the state of the world at the last
meeting, her optimal choice will depend only on the probability of the next meeting m to
occur exactly after k and before k+1 state-switches. Let that event be: f¿k <m<¿ k+1g:
The renewal system is as follows:
½
Prf¿k <m<¿ k+1g =
R 1
0 Prf¿k¡1 <m¡ t<¿ kg¸e¡‚tdt if k>0









By induction, we obtain:






Since Prf¿k <m<¿ k+1g =P r f¿k¡1 <m<¿ kg ‚
„+(k+1)‚; it follows that
Prf¿k <m<¿ k+1g is strictly decreasing in k:
Then, for any k odd, Prf¿k <m<¿ k+1g < Prf¿k¡1 <m<¿ kg: So that
Prf!m =2 j!1g =
1 X
k=0
Prf¿2k+1 <m<¿ 2k+2g <
1 X
k=0
Prf¿2k <m<¿ 2k+1g =P r f!m =1 j!1g:
Since the payo®s are symmetric, the conclusion is that the optimal strategy is imitation,
regardless of ¹:
In case with ¸1 6= ¸2, since the player knows the state of the world at the last meeting,
her optimal choice will depend only on the probability of the next meeting m to occur
22exactly after k and before k+1 state-switches, when the state at the current meeting is !1
(the analysis for !2 is symmetric). Let that event be: f¿k <m<¿ k+1j!1g: The renewal
system is as follows:
½
Prf¿k <m<¿ k+1j!1g =
R 1
0 Prf¿k¡1 <m¡ t<¿ kj!2g¸1e¡‚1tdt if k>0









By induction, we obtain that















t=1[„+(t¡[t=2])‚1+[t=2]‚2] if k is even
As Prf¿k <m<¿ k+1j!1g is continuous in ¹;¸1;¸ 2; it follows that there is a M(¹)s . t .i f
j¸1 ¡ ¸2j <M(¹); the optimal strategy is imitation, and M(¹) > 0;8¹:
The payo® for playing the imitation strategy is strictly increasing in
1 X
s=0
[Prf¿2s <m<¿ 2s+1j!1g¡Prf¿2s+1 <m<¿ 2s+2j!1g]
which is increasing in ¹: So it follows that M(¹) is increasing in ¹:
Finally: since Prf¿0 <m<¿ 1j!1g!1f o r¹ !1and any ¯xed ¸1 and ¸2; and
the optimal strategy is imitation when Prf¿0 <m<¿ 1j!1g > 1=2; it easily follows that
M(¹) !1for ¹ !1 :
For ¸1=¸2 !1 ; and ¹ ¯xed, however, Prf¿1 <m<¿ 2j!1g!1; so that the optimal
strategy is a2: the player will not choose imitation.
Proof of Proposition 4. Consider ¯rst the case for ¸1 6= ¸2; and say that ¸1 >¸ 2:
Proceed by contradiction, and suppose that (pure-strategies) imitation is an equilibrium.
In the previous section we proved that, for any ²>0; under imitation strategies, eventually,
x(t) 2 (0;²):
Consider a triple of consecutive state renewals: f¿k¡1;¿k;¿k+1g: So that ! =1 ; on
(¿k¡1;¿k) and the population play is x(t) ¼ 0;8t 2 [¿k;¿k+1]:
Once experimented at the encounter m 2 (¿k¡1;¿k); the player will know that the true
state is !1 and play a1 until her ¯rst encounter m1 2 (¿k;¿k+1): As x(t) 2 (0;²); at m1;
she will detect the state change with probability close to 1. Thus her expected gain from
experimenting is approximately ¹[¿k ¡ m]: If she experiments at m 2 (¿k;¿k+1); instead,
she will lose only a payo® of 1. Solving a simple compound renewal (Poisson) process,
we obtain that Pr(m 2 (¿k;¿k+1)) = ¸1=[¸1 + ¸2]a n dP r ( m 2 (¿k¡1;¿k)) = ¸2=[¸1 + ¸2]
independently of ¹: Since matchings and state renewals are independent processes, her













which is strictly larger than zero for ¹ large enough.
For ¸1 = ¸2; it follows that ¸1=[¸1 + ¸2]=1 =2=¸2=[¸1 + ¸2]; that x(t) 2f (0;");(1 ¡
";1)g almost always, and that 1=2 of the state durations are ²-undetected, for any ²>0: The
above argument holds unchanged for ²-undetected durations. When a renewal is detected
by the population play, the player expected gain from experimenting with probability ®
is bounded below by ¡1: Compounding ²-detected with ²-undetected durations, it follows
that the future average net gain from experimenting with probability ® is larger than
¹2=16 ¡ 3=4:
Note that the above derivation implies that if the population is playing the pure imita-
tion strategy, each single player at each match will prefer to deviate and experiment with
probability 1:
P r o o fo fL e m m a2 . Each player j will take an experimentation decision at matching
time t either with history (a1;0) or (a2;0):
Step 1: Construction of the joint process.
Consider ¯rst the case in which the true state of the world is !1; and hj(t)=( a2;0):
Consider the sequence of matching times m =fmkg1
k=1: mk >t ;and of the state-switches
¿=f¿kg1
k=1 : ¿k >t ;for any matching time mk; denote by xk the fraction of the population
playing a1 at time mk:
The realizations of m and ¿ are independent of whether j takes action a1 or a2: For
any ¯xed population strategy identi¯ed by " experimentation level, the actions of the j0s
opponents at future matches are independent of ai: Conditional on ai; the transition of j
opponents are identically distributed.
As long as a state-switch has not occurred, the players strategies can be described
as a Markov chain with states S = f(a1;0);(a2;0);(a1;1);(a2;¡1)g: We proceed by pair-
ing di®erent states representing di®erent continuations that depend on whether player
j experimented or not. Speci¯cally, we construct a non-autonomous Markov process as
follows. Consider state space be S2 where the ¯rst component of the couple refers to
states that belong to continuation generated by j taking ai = a1; and the second compo-
nent refers to states relative to ai = a2: De¯ne by coupling event the union of the states
such that their equilibrium strategy is the same. Formally, let C = f(s1;s 2)jPr(a1js1)=
Pr(a1js2)g: Conditional on the event C; the distribution on the continuations given ai = a1
is identical to the distribution on the continuations given ai = a2: The coupled pro-
cess is thus summarized by a 5-state non-autonomous Markov transition with state space








(1 ¡ xk)(1 ¡ ")0"(1 ¡ xk)00
(1 ¡ ")xk 0 "xk 00
0 "xk 0( 1 ¡ ")xk 0
0 "(1 ¡ xk)0( 1 ¡ ")(1 ¡ xk)0








The initial distribution of the coupling process for hj(t)=( a2;0) is (a1;1;a2;0) with
probability 1 ¡ x(t); and (a1;0;a2;¡1) with probability x(t):
The same transition matrix above describes the coupled process when hj(t)=( a1;0);
as long as the ¯rst component is now meant to represent j taking ai = a2; and the second,
j taking ai = a1: The two cases are subsumed by saying that the ¯rst component of the
duplicated process refers to instances following (pure-strategies) experimentation and the
second component, to instances following imitation. The initial distribution of the coupling
process for hj(t)=( a1;0) is thus (a2;0;a1;1) with probability 1 ¡ x(t); and (a2;¡1;a1;0)
with probability x(t):
In a completely analogous fashion, the transition is constructed for the case that ! =2 :
The probability of the next matching to occur after a state ! renewal has been calculated in
a previous Lemma, it is shown to be positive. By expanding the state space to account for
the transition under both !1 and !2; and compounding the relative transition probabilities
we obtain a non-autonomous Markov Process we denote by fXkg1
k=1:
Step 2: The expected time of coupling is ¯nite.
Looking at the above matrix, one can appreciate the key property of fXkg1
k=1 :f o r
any state s 6= C; the transition probability to C, p(s;C) is either " or 1 ¡ " (i.e. the
process is not decomposable); and p(C;C)=1( i . e .C is absorbing). When " 2 (0;1); as
that value is independent of time, we can treat the issue of recurrence of C as if we were
dealing with an autonomous Markov process, to immediately conclude that, for any s 6= C;
Ps(TC < 1)=1 ; where TC =i n f fkjXk = Cg and Ps is the probability induced on the
process by Xm = s:
T h ec a s ef o r" = 0 has already been ruled out from equilibrium analysis. For the case
for " =1 ; it follows that p((a1;1;a2;0);C)=p((a2;0;a1;1);C)=1 : Since 8k; xk < ¹ x1 < 1;
p((a1;0;a2;¡1);(a2;0;a1;1)jmk)=p((a2;¡1;a1;0);(a1;1;a2;0)jmk)=( 1¡ xk) > 0: Thus
the same result derived for " 2 (0;1) obtains.
P r o o fo fL e m m a3 . Already shown in the Proof of Proposition 4.
P r o o fo fL e m m a4 . Fix any " ¸ ¹ ": Consider any meeting where an individual j
holds history h =( a2;0): Let x = fx0;x 1;¢¢¢;g be an arbitrary increasing sequence of
25population plays at j0s future meetings, until the next ! renewal. Clearly x0 denotes the
population play at the present meeting, x1 the population play at the next meeting and so
on. Let M be the cardinality of x:
Step 1: The net gain for experimentation ¢U(a2;0j!1;x;"); when h =( a2;0);!=1 ;
and the population experimentation is "; admits a ¯nite upper bound, independently of x:
Consider the Markov transition derived in the proof of Proposition 2.
With probability x0;j's opponent plays a1: In such case, the process starts at (a1;0;a2;¡1);
player j gains a payo® of 1 from experimentation, and the path exits with probability 1¡":
The net gain if it will never enter in (a1;1;a2;0) is at most 0; and with probability smaller
than 1 ¡ (1 ¡ ") ¡ "(1 ¡ ") it will eventually reach (a1;1;a2;0): Thus











+( 1¡ x0)(1 + ") <
1
¹ "
+2= ¹ ¢ < 1;
t h ek e yo b s e r v a t i o ni st h a tt h eb o u n dw eh a v eo b t a i n e di su n i f o r mi nx:
Step 2: The net loss ¢U(a1;0j!1;x 0;x;") admits a strictly positive bound.
With probability x0;j's opponent plays a1: In such case, the process starts at (a2;¡1;a1;0);
player j's net gain is ¡1, the process exits with probability 1 ¡ ": With probability ";
the process enters the state (a1;1;a2;0); with probability 1 ¡ x1 and the state the state
(a1;0;a2;¡1); with probability x1: Since this is exactly the event (a2;0j!1;xnfx0g;"); her
net gain is bounded as:
¢U(a2;¡1;a1;0jx;")
< ¡1+"¢U(a2;0j!2;x nf x0g;")=¡1+"[x1
1
"
+( 1¡ x1)(1 + ")] = (1 ¡ x1)("
2 + " ¡ 1)
With probability (1 ¡ x0);j 's opponent plays a2; and the process starts at (a2;0;a1;1):
Player j's net gain is ¡1, the process exits with probability "; and with probability less than
1¡"; the process enters the state (a2;¡1;a1;0): T h ep l a y e rc a n n o tm a k ea n yp o s i t i v eg a i n s
unless the latter event occurs. The probability that the process loops inside (a2;0;a1;1) is
(1 ¡ ")(1 ¡ x1): So
¢U(a2;0;a1;1jx;") < ¡1+( 1¡ ")¢U(a2;¡1;a1;0jx;")
= ¡1+( 1¡ ")f¡1+"[x1
1
"
+( 1¡ x1)(1 + ")]g =( x1 ¡ 1)("
3 + ¡2" ¡ 1) ¡ 1:





+( 1¡ x1)(1 + ")]] + (1 ¡ x0)[¡1+"[¡1+"[x1
1
"
+( 1¡ x1)(1 + ")]]]
=( ¡1+x1 + x0 ¡ x1x0 (m))"
3 +( ¡x0x1 + x0)"
2 +( x0x1 ¡ x0 +2¡ 2x1)" + x0 ¡ 2+x1
= p(x1;x 0;")
Direct calculations show that p(¹ x"; ¹ x";") < 0 uniformly in "; so there must exist ±>0s u c h
that p(x1;x 0;") < 0f o rx0 > ¹ x" ¡ ± and x1 > ¹ x" ¡ ±: Note that since x is increasing, we
reduce the condition to x0 > ¹ x" ¡ ±:
So we conclude that ¢U(a1;0j!1;x;") > ^ ¢ > 0; which holds for any x s.t. x0 > ¹ x"¡±0:
Step 3: When the di®erence in utility ¢U(a2;0) is expanded conditioning on the events
fx0 < ¹ x" ¡ ±0g; and fx0 > ¹ x" ¡ ±0g; t h e¯ r s tt e r mv a n i s h e s .
For any x; denote by 1 ¡ x the sequence f1 ¡ xkg where xk 2 x: Using the transition
matrix, and keeping in mind that payo®s are symmetric, we note that, conditional on the




¢U(a2;0j!2;1 ¡ x;)=¢ U(a1;0j!1;x)
¢U(a2;0j!2;1 ¡ x)=¡¢U(a2;0j!1;x)
¢U(a1;0j!2;1 ¡ x)=¡¢U(a1;0j!1;x)
Now we can exploit the upper and lower bound, and the symmetry expanding ¢U(a2;0;")
as follows (for notational ease, we shall drop " from the formula).














f¢U(a2;0j!1;x)[Pr(!1j(a2;0);x) ¡ Pr(!2j(a2;0);1 ¡ x)]g




f¢U(a2;0j!1;x)[Pr(!1j(a2;0);x) ¡ Pr(!2j(a2;0);1 ¡ x)]g
dPr(xjx0 > ¹ x" ¡ ±0) ¢ Pr(x0 > ¹ x" ¡ ±0)
Consider the ¯rst term in the above equation. Let T(±;";¹) be the time taken by the
population play to reach ¹ x" ¡ ±; starting from x(0) = x"; when !1: Solving from the
27l a wo fm o t i o n ,w ek n o wt h a tT(±;";¹) ! 0f o r¹ !1 : Also we know that the law of
motion is increasing, which motivates our restriction to increasing x: We know that for any
time ¿ when the state switch from !2 to !2; the population play x(¿) >x " therefore the
time ^ T(±;";¹;¿); taken by the population play to reach ¹ x"¡±; starting from x(¿)w h e n!1;
satis¯es ^ T(±;";¹;¿) <T(±;";¹): Since the expected time until the next renewal is 1=¸1 > 0
one concludes that Pr(x0 < ¹ x" ¡ ±0) ! 0f o r¹ !1 :






Pr(! =2 ;(a2;0);1 ¡ x)
If we can show that Pr(!2;(a2;0);1¡x) ¼ Pr(!1;(a1;0);x); since both are bounded away
from zero, we obtain that
¤ ¼
Pr(!1;(a2;0);x)







< 1 ¡ b
for some positive bound b: In which case, since ¡1 < ^ ¢ < ¢U(a2;0j!1;x) < ¹ ¢ < 1; we
conclude that the second term is negative of the equation and dominates the ¯rst term,
for ¹ large enough. That concludes that ¢U(a2;0;") < 0: Invoking the symmetry already
pointed out, we also note that ¢U(a2;0;")=¢ U(a1;0;"):
In Proposition 4 we showed that P(TC < 1)=1 ;p (C;C)=a n d¢ U(a2;0;")=0






















where K0 is the random match such that mK0 = TC: The overtaking criterion then implies
®(")=0 :
Step 4: Pr(!2;(a2;0);1 ¡ x) ¼ Pr(!1;(a1;0);x):
Since Pr(!2)=P r ( !1); we only need to show that Pr(a2;0;1¡xj!2)=P r ( 1¡xj!2)=
Pr(xj!1)=P r ( a1;0;xj!1):
Consider a triple of state-switch times (¿k¡1;¿k;¿k+1): We know that the law of motion
has the following property: conditional on x(¿k¡1)=1 ¡ x(¿k); and on ¿k+1 ¡ ¿k =
¿k ¡ ¿k¡1 = T; it follows that, for any t 2 (0;T);x (t + ¿k¡1)=1¡ x(t + ¿k):
For ¿k large enough, x(t+¿k¡1)¡x(t+¿k) is negligible because E(¿k+1¡¿k)=E(¿k¡
¿k¡1); the process is strongly mixing, and ¹ is large. Since matchings run independently of
state-renewals, the distribution of the matching times on !1 approximates the distribution
of the matching times on !2:
28Since the sequence x on !2 depends only of x(t + ¿k¡1) and of the matching times on
!2; and the sequence 1¡x on !1 depends only of 1¡x(t+¿k) and of the matching times on
!1; the two previous observations imply that Pr(xj!2) ¼ Pr(1¡xj!1)f o r¿k large enough,
and ¹ large enough.
For ¸1 6= ¸2; the above reasoning can be extended as long as j¸1¡¸2j <M(¹); for some
M(¹); where as in Lemma 3, M(¹) is strictly positive, strictly increasing and M(¹) !1
for ¹ !1 :
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n5 . Say without loss of generality that at matching mk player
j's history is (a2;0): Player j must choose the optimal experimentation ® out of the compact
set [0;1]: Consider the coupling process previously introduced. Let M denote the set of
all sequences m of matching times. Let ¢u(s)=1f o rs =( a1;1;a2;0);(a1;0;a2;¡1);
¢u(s)=¡1f o rs =( a2;¡1;a1;0);(a2;0;a1;1); and ¢u(C)=0 :
T h ep a y o ®d i ® e r e n c ea tm a t c h i n gmk is
¢U(a2;0;")=E [¢u(s)Pr(sjt;m;!;m k;(a2;0))]:
Since the population law of motion x(t) is continuous in "; looking at the matrix in the
Proof of Lemma 2, one concludes Pr(sjt;m;!;m k;(a2;0)) to be continuous in "; so that, for
all s; ¢u(s)Pr(sjt;m;!;m k;(a2;0)) is continuous in ": Integrating a function continuous
in " against a measure independent of "; we obtain a continuous ¢U(a2;0;"):
Since P(TC < 1)=1 ;p (C;C)=1a n d¢ U(a2;0;") = 0 conditional on C; repeating
the argument of the previous Lemma, the overtaking criterion implies that ® = 1 is optimal
if and only if ¢U(a2;0;") > 0;®=0i fa n do n l yi f¢ U(a2;0;") < 0; and, ® =[ 0 ;1] when
¢U(a2;0;")=0 : Since ¢U((a2;0);1) < 0 (Lemma 4) and ¢U((a2;0);0) > 0 (Lemma
3), by continuity and the intermediate value theorem, there must exist a " such that
¢U(a2;0;")=0 : That implies " 2 ®„(")=[ 0 ;1]; so that such experimentation value " is
an equilibrium. In Lemma 4 we showed that for ¹ large, ¢U(a2;0;") < 0 unless " is small
enough. That shows that lim„!1"(¹)=0 ; where "(¹)=s u pf" j " 2 ®„ (")g:
Proof of Proposition 6. The ¯rst step consist of setting up the equilibrium condition
on the auxiliary process.
Step 1: Construction of the auxiliary process.
Consider T(¹;"); the amount of time needed for the population play xj2 to reach x(T)=
1=2s t a r t i n gf r o mx(0) = ¹ x"; when the state is !2 (by symmetry, that is also the lapse from
x(0) = x" to x(T)=1 =2a n d! =1 : Fix ¸ =1 ; for ¹ large, the probability that a renewal
occurs, before x(T)=1 =2 is reached, converges to 0. The population play when !1; will
get arbitrarily close to ¹ x": Since x0(¹ x") is bounded away from 0, T(¹;") is close to the time
29incurred between ¿;the time an ! state switch and the time T : x(T)=1 =2; conditional on
not there being any renewal between ¿ and T: As the expected time of renewal is 1=¸ =1 ;
by ergodicity T(¹;") may be considered also as the expected fraction of time spent by the

















Note that ¹T(¹;") !1 ; for " ! 0:
We write the indi®erence equation distinguishing between the fraction of time spent by
the population with x(t)  1=2a n dw i t hx(t) > 1=2:
T(¹;")¢U(¹;";t  T)+( 1¡ T(¹;"))¢U(¹;";t > T) = 0 (6)
We know that T(¹;") !1for " ! 0a n dT(¹;") ! 0f o r¹ !1 : S i n c ew ew a n tt o
study the value of T(¹;") exactly for " ! 0a n d¹ !1 ; we prefer to isolate the time T
and rewrite Equation (6) as follows.
½
0=T¢U(¹;";t  T)+( 1¡ T)¢U(¹;";t > T)
T = T(¹;")
(7)
We will leave the second equation as calculated in Equation (5), and approximate the ¯rst
equation for small " and large ¹: We shall obtain T as a function of ¹ and ":
Consider the population law of motion on !1: Let by x„;"(t;x0) denote the solution
of the related Cauchy problem with initial state x0; and let T„;"(x0;x) be the solution of
x„;"(T;x0)=x: Fix small ±>0; straightforward calculations show that lim"!0
T„;"(x";x"+–)
T„;"(x";1=2) =
1; that T„;"(1=2; ¹ x")=1; and that lim„!0 T„;"(1=2; ¹ x" ¡ ±)=0 :
That means that, conditional on no state-switches occurring in the duration, for " small
and ¹ large, Pr(x(t)¡x" 2 (0;±)jx(t)  1=2) ¼ 1; and Pr(¹ x"¡x(t) 2 (0;±)jx(t) > 1=2) ¼ 1:
As long as ¹ is large enough, the probability of a state switch is small enough, so that we can
approximate x(t) with x" +±=2o nt<T;and with ¹ x" ¡ ±=2o nt>T :Note moreover that
lim"!0 lim–!0
x"+–
" = 1 so we can approximate x(t) ¼ " on t  T and similarly, x(t) ¼ 1¡"
on t>T :After such simpli¯cations, we obtain that Pr(! =1 j(a2;0);t<T)=1¡ " and
Pr(! =2 j(a2;0);t>T)=1¡ ":















2 ¡ 1 ¼ 0; (8)
30With the simpli¯cation obtained in Step 1 we can approximate the transitions in the
coupling process by omitting all terms of order "2 and above. Proceeding in the same
fashion as in Proof of Lemma 4, we derive that, when M meetings are yet to occur before





t ¼ 1+( 1¡ ")
M¡2 X
t=0
(1 ¡ 2t") ¼ M ¡ (M +1 )
2 "
¢U(a2;0j!2;M;t>T) ¼¡ 1+( 1¡ ")"(1 ¡ (1 ¡ 2")) ¡ "(1 ¡ 2") ¼¡ 1 ¡ "
The distribution of M the remaining meetings in the reaction stage, given the time of
meeting mk; and the order of meeting k; is Poisson of parameter ¹T: When taking the
expected value of a polynomial against a Poisson we obtain a higher ordered polynomial.
As ¹T is large, we can eliminate all lower powered terms in ¹T and we can approximate
M ¼ ¹T ¡ k: That is equivalent to treat the distribution of meetings as approximately
uniform. By the same token, the distribution of the order of meeting k can be treated as
an uniform draw out of ¹T + 1 outcomes (note that we are including the meeting of order


































Now we can wrap up equation (7): after approximating it to eliminate higher powered "















2 ¡ 1 ¼ 0:




Equation(8) is a cubic equation that has only one admissible solution T(¹;") 2 (0;1);
the solution is continuous in ": Since we are interested in approximation for small "; we
¯rst solve for T(¹;") in Equation(8); with " =0 : The equation 1

















































We can ¯nally compare this with the expression for T with T(";¹); t h ea c t u a lt i m es p e n t
by the system for x(t) < 1=2; as calculated from the law of motion in equation (5), so that
the equilibrium condition can be approximated the following equation, which, comfortingly,



























When ¸1 6= ¸2; system (7) is modi¯ed so as to allow for two di®erent times T1(¹;")a n d
T2(¹;")a s s o c i a t e dt ot h es t a t e s!1 and !2: For ¹ !1 ; it follows that T1(¹;")=T2(¹;") ! 1
from the law of motion. So that all the solutions of the system above will be of the same
order in ¹; and rest of the analysis is similar to the previous treatment.
References
[1] Banerjee A.V. [1992]: \A Simple Model of Herd Behavior" The Quarterly Journal of
Economics, 107: 797-817.
[2] Bjornestedt J. [1993]: \Experimentation, Imitation and Evolutionary Dynamics" Uni-
versity of Stockolm, mimeo
[3] Bjornestedt J. and J. Weibull [1993]: \Nash Equilibrium and Evolution by Imitation"
in K. Arrow and E. Colombatto (eds.) Rationality in Economics, MacMillan New York
32[4] Boylan R. [1992]: \Laws of Large Numbers for Dynamical Systems with Randomly
Matched Individuals" Journal of Economic Theory 57: 473-504
[5] Borgers and Sarin [1999]: \Learning through Reinforcement and Replicator Dynamics"
Journal of Economic Theory 77:1 - 1 4
[6] Cabrales and Sobel [1992]: \On the Limit Points of Discrete Selection Dynamics"
Journal of Economic Theory 57:4 0 7 - 4 1 9
[7] Davis M. [1993]: Markov Models and Optimization Chapman and Hall, London
[8] Dekel and Scotchmer [1992]: \On the Evolution of Optimizing Behavior" Journal of
Economic Theory 57: 392-406
[9] Durrett R. [1996]: Probability Theory and Examples Belmont CA, Wadsworth Pu.
[10] Ellison and Fudenberg [1993]: \Rules of Thumb for Social Learning" Journal of Po-
litical Economy 51:6 1 2 - 4 3
[11] Friedman [1991]: \Evolutionary Games in Economics" Econometrica 59: 637-666
[12] Hofbauer J. and J.W. Weibull [1996]: \Evolutionary Selection against Dominated
Strategies" Journal of Economic Theory 71: 558-73
[13] Keller G. and S. Rady [1999]: \Optimal Experimentation in a Changing Environment"
Review of Economic Studies forthcoming
[14] Nachbar [1990]: \Evolutionary Selection Dynamics in Games: Convergence and Limit
Properties" International Journal of Game Theory 19:5 9 - 8 9
[15] Moscarini G. Ottaviani M. and L. Smith [1998]: \Social Learning in a Changing World"
Economic Theory 11: 657-65.
[16] Rustichini A. and A. Wolinsky [1995]: \Learning about a Variable Demand in the
Long Run" Journal of economic Dynamics and Control 19: 1283-1292
33[17] Smith L. and P. Sorensen [1999]: \Pathological Outcomes of Observational Learning"
Econometrica, forthcoming
[18] Samuelson and Zhang [1992]: \Evolutionary Stability in Asymmetric Games" Journal
of Economic Theory 57: 363-391
[19] Schlag K. [1998]: \Why Imitate, and If So, How?" Journal of Economic Theory 78:
130-156
[ 2 0 ]W e i b u l lJ .W .[ 1 9 9 5 ] :Evolutionary Game Theory Cambridge MA, MIT press
34